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Abstract 
 
 
 
The imperative to improve healthcare efficiency is now stronger than ever. Rapidly increasing 
healthcare demand and the prospect of healthcare cost exploding require that measures be 
taken to make healthcare organizations become more efficiency-aware. Alignment of 
organizational interests is therefore important. One of the main hurdles to overcome is the 
provision of the right incentives to healthcare workers, in particular physicians. 
 
In this research we investigate the incentive system for physicians in university hospitals. We 
present an inquiry held in a large university hospital in the Netherlands and show that non-
financial incentives receive significantly more support among physicians than financial 
incentives. Over 95 percent of the physicians indicated they derive more work stimulus from 
research possibilities or scientific status than from wage. Over 80 percent of the physicians also 
indicated they prefer to be able to do more research. We therefore identified a broad class of 
non-financial incentives aimed at physicians in university hospitals: research facilities. 
 
The main tradeoff in using research facilities within an incentive system is between efficient 
resource utilization and inducement effects. This thesis constructs a principal-multi-agent 
model where agents engage in both care and research and which includes heterogeneity and 
private information. We study how research facilities incentives can be used to improve 
hospital performance if the current wage system is left intact. We show that research facilities 
are optimally used as incentives for both care and research activities, and that the hospital 
offers different contracts depending on physician ability and valuation. Moreover, if physicians 
need to reveal their valuations for research facilities, the hospital finds it optimal to allow 
physicians to make a rent. We discuss some implications of extending the theoretical results to 
practice. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The aim of this research 
 
The healthcare sector has evolved rapidly throughout the last decades, both in terms of quality 
of care and in terms of its cost. Since 1970 the inflation adjusted government spending on 
healthcare throughout the developed world has risen by nearly 5 percent per year (Hagist & 
Kotlikoff, 2005) and according to OECD (2008) figures it currently averages around 10 
percent of GDP of OECD countries. While there is a strongly embodied ethical paradigm to 
provide the best patient care available, there is a limit on what can be spend to achieve this. Yet 
healthcare expenditure keeps facing upward pressure as patients become more demanding and 
new technologies spread. Moreover, societal ageing and lengthening lifetimes, which are 
important factors in healthcare cost, lead to increased future demand for quality and quantity 
of care and to major acceleration in the rise of healthcare cost (see e.g. Freund and Smeeding, 
2002). Reducing healthcare cost therefore is a socially important objective and it is now more 
important than ever to consider the efficiency of healthcare organizations. 
 
A fundamental problem in creating efficient and effective organizations – whether in 
healthcare or elsewhere – is the design of incentive-compatible protocols that, despite the self-
interest of individual agents, lead to system wide alignment and optimal performance on the 
system level. What we mean by this is that organizational protocols (e.g. couplings between 
performance of the organization and individual reward) need to provide executive agents with 
incentives to behave such that organization output is optimized, even though the agents may 
be self interested, hold private information and personal goals, and may not be so much 
concerned about the performance of the entire organization. The design of such incentive-
compatible protocols, which we will label together as an incentive system, is a fundamental 
part of the framework for efficient organizations. 
 
In this research we address incentive-compatible protocols in a specific type of health care 
organizations: university hospitals. In particular we focus on the design of an efficiency-
promoting incentive system for these hospitals. We consider the measures available to 
stimulate the university hospital’s departments and its individual healthcare workers (in this 
case the physicians) to deliver high and efficient performance. Physicians are of primary 
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importance as their decisions directly influence health care operations and their willingness to 
accept efficient work plans (for e.g. surgery planning) is paramount to the success of such 
plans. In typical non-profit university hospitals, as in the Netherlands, extensive monetary 
incentives are no option. Such incentives within the semi-public sector are hard to justify 
socially in the current political (and economical) climate. Therefore, after consideration and 
discussion with involved health care professionals1, we consider a special principle inherent to 
university hospitals but not present in regular hospitals: the allocation of research facilities. 
 
Research is one of the key pillars of university hospitals. It is an important factor in the 
determination of the status of a hospital, and indirectly impacts the number of treatments the 
hospital can do. Moreover, discussions with a hospital department head suggested that 
obtaining (scientific) status, delivering research performance, and working on challenging 
specialized cases, while using class leading techniques and state-of-the-art  equipment are key 
drivers for physicians in university hospitals. Research facilities such as research budget and 
operating room time – which stimulate the above criteria – can therefore be used to provide 
incentives to departments and physicians in university hospitals, and thus can be used to 
promote efficiency and to increase overall performance. At the same time, awarding more 
research facilities to physicians who perform well on regular care may lead to inefficiencies 
regarding resource utilization. Physicians who are naturally better at research, but perform less 
well at care, cannot make full resource-advantage. Therefore it is important to determine the 
right protocol for allocating research facilities. 
 
The aim of this research is as follows: 
 
 
Determine a mechanism for the allocation of research facilities to 
physicians in university hospitals that maximizes hospital performance. 
 
 
We will first examine the literature related to this problem. We also present empirical findings 
from a survey we held at the Erasmus Medical Center for the usability of research facilities 
within an incentive system. Thereafter we begin the analysis by constructing a framework 
capturing the dynamics of performance and manipulability that are involved with a research 
facilities allocation mechanism to physicians in university hospitals. We analyze this framework 
                                                     
 
 
 
1 For this study we held discussions with a department head of the Erasmus Medical Center in 
the Netherlands, and held discussions within a dedicated discussion group of that hospital. 
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under scenarios of complete and incomplete contractibility. Next we try to construct a research 
facilities allocation mechanism that is optimal with respect to this framework under private 
information. We want to assess the equilibrium behavior under this mechanism, the involved 
design trade-offs, and whether, and under what conditions, the university hospital should 
implement this research facilities allocation mechanism. We will mainly do this from an 
economic point of view, but will also briefly touch some of the non-economic dilemmas 
involved. 
 
We begin, however, by broadly describing the incentive problem in creating efficient 
organizations, and the importance and difficulty of incentive management as a solution to it. 
We then precisely define the problem of research facilities based incentive management in 
university hospitals and some of the motivation behind it. We conclude this introduction with 
a guide to the remainder of our work. 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Incentive management 
 
There are many wide-ranging claims about the importance of incentives, but effectively, 
incentives are at the base of all human behavior – in particular economic behavior. Incentives 
are any factors (remunerable, moral or otherwise) that drive people towards their goals. They 
enable or motivate a particular course of action, or count as a reason for preferring one choice 
to alternatives. Incentive systems therefore are central to economic activity, both in terms of 
individual decision making and in terms of cooperation and competition in a larger 
institutional structure. There is ample scientific evidence as a foundation to this claim (see e.g. 
Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta and Shaw (1998), or for the healthcare sector: Hillman, Pauly and 
Kerstein (1989)). 
 
As it is important for organizations that interests are aligned, and that workers are stimulated 
to communicate, (co)operate and collaborate in order to meet the organizations interests and 
goals, the provision of a proper incentive system is important for the success of organizations. 
The problem of designing the incentive system is in a broader sense also referred to as the 
principal-agent problem, addressing the two groups of agents involved: principals and 
executive agents. Typically the system performance is in the direct interest of the principals 
(e.g. management) who need the executive agents (e.g. workers) to realize high system 
performance. If the goals of the agents and the principal are not aligned, the performance of 
the system may not be optimal. In order to achieve alignment the principals have an array of 
incentive options available. Remunerable incentives (commonly captured in so called incentive 
contracts) are one of them, but there are many others such as awards, trainee programs, 
research grants, etc. The problem lies in identifying and selecting the right and applicable 
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incentives, in selecting the measures by which agents are assessed, and in deciding the rules by 
which measures are translated and rewards are allocated.  
 
The design of incentive systems is more difficult than it may seem at first glance. Although a 
main concern of economists, it can involve many parties: from managers and workers, to 
legislators and regulators as well as lawyers and judges. Moreover, it requires the consideration 
of all organizational complications and not just the principal features. Most complications are 
not straightforwardly visible and need thorough analysis to become fully apparent and 
transparent. One possible complication is for example the ‘gaming’ of the incentive system by 
agents (e.g. deliberate downgrading of quality in piece-rate systems). Therefore design of 
incentive systems requires an engineering approach and a combination of different techniques 
to be effective. Incentive management, which is the collective name for this approach to the 
design and maintenance of the organizational incentive mechanism as well as the associated 
protocols, serves as the important tool in creating efficient organizations. It directly addresses 
the issue of aligning workers’ interest with those of the organization, and if efficiency is among 
them it aims to stimulate workers to operate more efficiently.  
 
The design process of incentive management can typically be divided into three phases: 
theoretical design, empirical validation, and implementation. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of 
the different phases and the typical activities involved in each phase.  
 
 
Design process of incentive management 
 
 
 
  
 
 Define strategic rationale 
 Asses incentive possibilities 
and identify key incentives 
 Identify system dynamics and 
determine class of incentive 
system 
 Design incentive mechanism 
 Select performance criteria 
 Determine optimal 
configuration 
 Assess equilibrium and 
emergent behavior 
 Assess social and legal 
implications 
 
 
 Work out practical design 
 Select/construct 
representative testing 
environment 
 Define and communicate 
incentive story 
 Implement incentive system in 
testing environment 
 Assess empirical results 
 Redesign system 
 If satisfactory: create success 
story and process transition 
plan 
 
 
 
 Select people to lead the 
change 
 Communicate incentive and 
success story 
 Roll out incentive system over 
ogranization 
 Track and monitor 
implementation 
 Realize goals and new 
initiatives 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Phases in design process of incentive management and (non-exhaustive) list of activities per phase 
 
 
Theoretical Design Empirical Validation 
 
Implementation 
Inducing Efficient Behavior Through the Allocation of Research Facilities 
13 
 
 
 
 
In this research we will address part of the first phase, i.e. the theoretical design, of an 
innovative incentive system for university hospitals based on research facilities allocation. We 
will mainly address the economic issues involved, but will also give some non-economic 
considerations. We will explain the case in detail in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Research facilities based incentive management in 
university hospitals 
 
The health care sector is no ordinary sector in terms of management purposes. The complex 
environment of hospitals with highly, but differently, trained professionals arguably places 
hospitals among the most challenging organizations to manage (e.g. Mintzberg, 1997). 
Mintzberg identifies four quadrants of influence: medical specialists, nurses, managers, and 
trustees. Each quadrant has its own objectives and its own approach to how it wants to achieve 
those objectives. The objectives are related to the goals of the hospital as a whole, but are 
generally not aligned. 
 
The goals of a university hospital are generally threefold:  
 
 providing the best possible patient care, 
 the best possible research,  
 and the best possible education.  
 
As we have already argued, increasing hospital efficiency is currently of major importance for 
sustaining the level of patient care in the future. In particular physicians play an important role 
as their decisions do not only influence the health of patients but also the cost of care. In its 
aims to increase hospital efficiency, management can gain insight in the operation of the 
various departments under its control through performance evaluations. The level of direct 
authority of management over medical specialists and nurses is, however, very limited. 
Physicians require autonomy in their work and generally do not accept management’s 
prescriptive efficiency-measures if these limit their freedom. Physicians are typically also more 
concerned with quality of care and can be afraid that efficiency-measures have a negative 
impact on quality. Yet, for the introduction of solutions to organizational inefficiencies taking 
the form of some kind of protocol (e.g. prescriptive ‘rules’ for surgery planning) it is essential 
to have the support of the physicians, who as decision making agents directly influence the 
underlying process. Getting hospitals to work more efficiently is therefore, although important, 
a difficult task. 
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Accordingly, it is imperative to identify the right incentives for targeting the individual 
physicians. In health care organizations incentives have traditionally been less present than in 
business. In typical non-profit university hospitals, as in the Netherlands, extensive financial 
incentives are not an option. Such incentives within the semi-public sector are hard to justify 
socially in the current political (and economical) climate.  
 
After consideration, debate and discussion with involved health care professionals, we 
therefore proceed to the examination of another possibility: the allocation of research facilities. 
The reasoning behind this is as follows. Generally, physician payment levels in university 
hospitals are below those of regular hospitals. But university hospitals do offer the possibility 
to do research, achieve scientific status and operate at the frontier of what is medically 
possible. This likely is why many academic physicians choose to work in a university hospital 
over working in a regular hospital. Therefore financial incentives may be less powerful in this 
setting  than incentives coupled to research performance, such as research facilities. Yet, it 
typically are (weak) financial incentives which (if at all) are used in the university hospital and 
often they are not based on the objectives of management. In the Netherlands for example, 
physicians in university hospitals receive: 
 
a) a fixed wage only, and 
b) a promotion to a higher wage level only on long term basis. 
 
Now, by embedding the allocation of research budget and available operating room time for 
research in the right incentive-compatible protocol, departments and physicians may be 
induced in delivering more qualitative and more efficient performance. 
 
What exactly can be labeled as ‘research facilities’? Possibilities include research time – such as 
operating room time for clinical trials, lab time, time for congress visits, etc. – and research 
budget – in the form of monthly fees (expendable to for example research assistants), prizes, 
research grants, etc. – but also dedicated facilities – such as entry to restricted trainee 
programs. In this study we will leave the precise determination of research facilities open, 
thereby taking a high level approach. We only require that research facilities are the facilities 
(mostly already in existence) that contribute to the (individual) research performance. We can 
assume the facilities are such that no extra money is required to be put into the system (which 
leads to a budget balanced solution), but this assumption is not strictly necessary2. The total of 
                                                     
 
 
 
2 We will give optimality conditions to determine the optimal level of research facilities should 
this be freely determinable 
Inducing Efficient Behavior Through the Allocation of Research Facilities 
15 
 
 
 
 
research facilities available in any period then may be represented as a pie of single unity which 
can be distributed over the different physicians. 
 
Figure 1.2 gives a schematic overview of the typical organization of a university hospital in 
terms of different allocation levels of research facilities (grossly defined as above). It shows 
how research facilities are generally allocated from the hospital level to departments, and from 
departments to workgroups consisting of individual physicians. Typical allocations are in 
relation to research performance3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Typical organization of allocation levels for research facilities in a university hospital 
 
 
Designing an optimal incentive system based on the allocation of research facilities is a non-
trivial and challenging problem. We can view the problem as a distributed optimization 
problem with an objective function that depends on the private information of the 
workgroups/physicians. The central goal is twofold: 
 
                                                     
 
 
 
3 For example, in the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands departments are rewarded 
research budget based on research performance (the dependence has even been increased 
recently). 
H
o
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Department 
 
 
 
 
Workgroup 
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 to induce the physicians into delivering efforts that maximize hospital performance 
(in regular care and research), and 
 to achieve an optimal allocation of research facilities that maximizes research 
performance. 
 
In this problem the workgroups are characterized by their capabilities in research and in regular 
care. Moreover, they have different valuations regarding research facilities and they deliver 
individual care and research performance. In return for their performance they receive wage 
and research facilities as specified by the allocation mechanism. The two goals listed above 
now conflict in the sense that the allocation of research facilities in response to regular care 
performance may tend to award workgroups who perform well on regular care, while these 
workgroups may not be the best performers at research, and thus may not maximize research 
output. 
 
An allocation mechanism should optimize the hospital performance for the equilibrium 
workgroup strategies, taking the above conflicts in account. The mechanism therefore requires 
sufficient structure to enable strong theoretical claims about the strategies that workgroups will 
select in equilibrium and the optimality properties of the final solutions. It should also carefully 
deal with negative effects that could arise due to the gaming of the incentive system. Moreover, 
feasibility considerations related to informational aspects, including communication properties 
such as message size and information processing complexity play a pivotal role. If for example, 
astronomical amounts of information must be transmitted, or if the strategy-determining 
problems to be solved by individual workgroups are tremendously complex, the practical 
feasibility of the mechanism is in question. Computation and agent self-interest may however 
also interact in non-obvious ways: agent-bounded rationality can for example also be used to 
design a mechanism that cannot be manipulated without solving an intractable problem (see 
Parkes, 2001). Final design-issues include trade-offs regarding ‘fairness’ or ‘social desirability’ 
of the mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Outline of this thesis 
 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the relevant literature on 
incentive management and the techniques that are useful to our approach. Moreover, it 
discusses how our contributions relate to the literature base. In chapter 3 we present empirical 
findings from a survey held among medical specialists at Erasmus Medical Center in 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The survey gives empirical foundation for the usability of 
research facilities within an incentive system for physicians in university hospitals. Chapter 4 
sets up a stylized model for the research facilities based incentive system. In chapters 5 and 6 
we respectively analyze the scenarios of complete and incomplete contractibility and derive the 
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optimal contracts for both scenarios. We do this for both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
physicians. We pay particular attention to the consequences of ignoring heterogeneity and we 
give a comparison of the optimal contracts with the ‘current’ contracts. In chapter 7 we 
construct an optimal contract that holds in the case of private information. Chapter 8 
translates our theoretical results back to practice. Finally, chapter 9 contains our conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Literature 
 
 
 
 
Economics is all about incentives. The literature base regarding incentive management is 
therefore, not surprisingly, vast. It has reached into many areas of motivation and 
compensation and it has addressed a multitude of mechanisms that are available for inducing 
workers to act in the interest of their employers. In this chapter we discuss the relevant 
literature and some of the previous theoretical models that inspired our analysis. We order this 
chapter according to the various sub-disciplines in which the literature can be categorized. 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Agency theory 
 
The classical model of principal-agent relations and incentive contracts are studied in the field 
of agency theory. The canonical problem being the owner-manager situation, the earliest 
literature dates back to the 1950’s and 60’s and is from a.o. Baumol (1959), Simon (1959), 
Cyert and March (1963) and Williamson (1964). Arrow (1971) and Wilson (1968) explicitly 
explored risk sharing among individuals or groups. They described the risk-sharing problem as 
one that arises when cooperating parties have different attitudes toward risk. 
 
Agency theory was later extended to include the so-called agency problem that occurs when 
cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Ross, 1973). Much of the later work has built on the early premises and centered around the 
issues that arise when (i) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (ii) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. Baker (1992) 
shows that in many empirically relevant cases agent payoff is not based on the principals 
objective. Influential work has further been from Perrow (1986) who reestablishes the 
importance of incentives and self-interest in organizational thinking. Although he asserts that 
agency theory is different from organization theory, agency theory is consistent with the nature 
of cooperative behavior (see the classical work of Barnard, 1938) and on the inducements and 
contributions of the employment relationship (e.g. March and Simon, 1958). Furthermore, the 
economic models of agent relations have contributed to organization theory and have yielded 
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important insights into institutional systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives and risk. We 
further refer to Eisenhardt (1989) for a detailed overview of the field of agency theory. 
Throughout this thesis we will use methodology and techniques from several fields applicable 
to agency theory: contract theory, tournament theory, game theory and mechanism design. 
 
 
 
 
2.2  Contract theory and the theory of the firm 
 
Related to the field of agent theory is contract theory and the theory of the firm. The classical 
linear contract model which deals with a remunerable contract, can be specified as (see e.g. 
Baker, 1992): 
 
             
 
where   designates the total wage,   the base salary,   the performance related payments (or 
bonus),        a performance function resulting in a total performance measure,   the 
(unobserved) level of effort, and   any exogenous effects on the outcome. Under the 
assumption that the principal’s objective        is not contractible, Baker shows that the 
optimal linear contract has a performance measure that is highly correlated with the principals 
objective. If correlation is low and the agent is risk-averse, he shows that it is best to dampen 
the performance related payments.  
 
The theory also addresses the ownership of assets (e.g. Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1985) 
and Grossman and Hart (1986)). Transfer of ownership is a special case of the linear contract 
where   is negative and   is such that the agent is a full residual claimant. Interesting is the 
work of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) who examine the differences between contracting 
and employment. They show how the effectiveness of low-powered incentives within the firm 
may be enhanced by simultaneously placing constraints on the employee’s freedom to act. 
Their model is more complicated and also involves a configuration of ownership. 
 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) treat subjective performance measures as an alternative to 
the explicit contract to mitigate incentive distortions by imperfect objective measures. They 
show with benchmark analysis that a combination of objective and subjective performance 
measures can outperform both explicit and implicit contracts alone, if these would otherwise 
both result in a negative profit. 
 
The payoff mechanisms for physicians in particular have also been widely investigated. 
Robinson (2001) offers a good overview. He argues that the three worst mechanisms are fee-
for-service, capitation and salary. Fee-for-service would reward the provision of inappropriate 
services, capitation would reward the denial of appropriate services and harm the chronically 
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ill, and salary would undermine productivity and foster a bureaucratic mentality. Robinson 
argues that better mechanisms are hybrids of these three mechanisms. Most of the situations in 
practice as well as the existing literature also involve a combination of these three mechanisms 
(see e.g. Pauly et al. (1990), Berwick (1996), Emery (1999) and Hanchak et al. (1996)). Pauly et 
al. provide a direct test between hospital ownership type and the effectiveness of primary care 
physician incentives. Their results indicate that for-profit ownership does enhance the power 
and need of management to offer effective rewards for parsimonious use of health resources.  
Hillman, Pauly and Kerstein (1989) use a regression model to test the hypothesis that financial 
incentives may change physician’s behavior towards patients. Their conclusions are in favor of 
this hypothesis and they also confirm a positive relation between incentives and hospital 
profitability. Teleki et al. (2006) interview physicians about the application of financial 
incentives to stimulate quality of care and cost efficiency. Many supported incentives for high 
quality care but question measurement accuracy, bonus payment financing, and health plan 
involvement. Moreover, the interviewed physicians expressed the need for accurate and timely 
data, peer comparisons, and more patient time, staff support, and consultations with colleagues 
to successfully monitor and deliver quality care.  
 
There have not been real field experiments for incentive systems for physicians, but there have 
been good comparisons and empirical evaluations. See Armour et al. (2001) and Petersen et al. 
(2006) for overviews. To the best of our knowledge, the allocation of research facilities as an 
incentive mechanism for university hospitals such as we suggest, has been left uncovered. 
However, in light of the existing literature this seems a fruitful direction for research. 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Tournament theory 
 
A useful analysis is also into the theory of tournaments and relative performance. This theory 
is applicable to many situations were multiple agents compete for (a share of) a resource. 
Tournaments are compensation schemes in which contestants’ rewards are based on relative 
differences and not on marginal productivity. Examples include research tournaments (e.g. 
Taylor, 1995) and promotion systems (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Relative performance 
extends the basic linear contract model to (see e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983): 
 
        
        
   ∑          
 
 
for a tournament with   agents, and for agent   total wage   , fixed salary   , performance 
bonus   and individual performance measure function         with    the unobserved effort and 
  any exogenous effects that are common over agents.  
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Green and Stokey (1983) show that in the absence of a common shock, the use of optimal 
independent contracts dominates the use of the optimal tournament. If, however, a common 
shock is present with a sufficiently diffuse distribution, using the optimal tournament 
dominates using independent contracts.  
 
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the optimal allocation of prizes in multi-prize contests under 
the objective of maximizing expected effort. They consider ability-dependent cost functions 
for effort – which is similar to our case – and they display the equilibria of contestants for 
linear, convex and concave cost functions. In particular they show that if the cost functions are 
linear or concave it is optimal to allocate the prize sum to a single ‘first’ prize, and that for 
sufficiently convex cost functions it is optimal to distribute the prize money over all agents 
except the last placed agent. Their framework is however different from ours, in that we do 
not consider ex ante fixed prizes and have multiple ability characteristics and a two-
dimensional effort space. Also, our case involves adverse selection dilemmas. 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Data envelopment analysis 
 
Data envelopment analysis is a technique from management science which deals with the 
assessment of performance. The term was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
who studied the efficiency of decision making units. Since then it has become the general 
heading under which many papers on the assessment of performance have been written. 
Unfortunately the term is somewhat non-intuitive. Nevertheless the technique is useful and  is 
interestingly captured in the work of Norman and Stroker (1991). They argue that the analysis 
of performance should not be limited to a few isolated measures such as profit or cost. Instead 
a whole range of input and output factors should be considered to get a comprehensive insight 
in how well departments and individual agents are performing in comparison to each other. 
Useful performance measures for the public sector include staff utilization, productivity, 
throughput, accuracy, customer satisfaction, number of publications, client/staff ratio’s etc. 
Moreover, they introduce the notion of relative efficiency, which corresponds to a individually 
weighted ratio of output and input measures which is individually maximized for each agent or 
department under consideration. By forcing the weighted sum of inputs to be equal to 1, it is 
possible to gain an objective measure of the relative efficiency of each agent or department. 
 
Data envelopment analysis can be useful as a tool for measuring and calculating the 
performance differences between hospital departments and medical specialists. In this research 
we will not directly use the technique (we assume the performance evaluations to be 
performed external to our model), but it is important to know that good methods for 
performance assessment are available. Throughout this thesis we will assume the evaluations 
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are performed correctly, as to reasonably reflect effort levels such as through data envelopment 
analysis, but do not impose explicit restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Game theory and mechanism design 
 
Game theory and mechanism design are the fields we draw most from in this research. Game 
theory, which is a branch of applied mathematics, is used widely in economics to model 
situations in which decision makers interact. It is not, however, only of interest to analyze and 
understand such situations, but also to design the mechanisms that govern them (e.g. how to 
induce the physician to behave as desired). It is here that the field of mechanism design arises. 
By setting the right rules, mechanism design plays a major role in the engineering of important 
economic institutions and markets.  
 
The general mechanism design problem is an implementation problem which can be described 
as follows (using notation consistent with Parkes (2001)). Consider a system with   agents, 
indexed         and a set of outcomes  . Each agent has private information about its 
utility for different outcomes, as characterized by its type       where    is the set of all 
possible preferences to agent  . Let          denote the utility of outcome     to an agent 
with type   , such that    is preferred to    by agent   if and only if                     . 
Each agent has a strategy           which is a complete contingent plan, or a decision rule, 
defining the action an agent will select in every possible state of the world, for a set    of all 
possible strategies to agent  . The problem is to compute the solution to a social choice 
function             that selects an optimal outcome  
       based on the types 
            of all agents, or alternatively to maximize an outcome function (e.g. profit). 
This is achieved by specifying a mechanism                  where             is 
an outcome rule such that      is the outcome implemented by the mechanism for strategy 
profile            .  
 
There are several game-theoretical concepts to compute the strategies agents will select in 
equilibrium. The most well-known are the concepts of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950), Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967/68), and dominant strategy equilibrium (Gale, 1953), listed 
here in order of increasing strength. A mechanism implements a social choice function      if 
the outcome computed with equilibrium agent strategies is a solution to the social choice 
function for all possible agent preferences. The mechanism can have various properties 
depending on the outcomes it generates. These include, but are not limited to, Pareto 
optimality, allocative efficiency, (weak) budget balance, and individual rationality. For a full 
description of these properties we refer to Parkes (2001). Due to the revelation principle (see 
Myerson, 1981 and 1982) it may be possible to restrict attention to finding a direct mechanism 
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in which each agent reports its type. Pathak and Sönmez (2009) introduce a method to asses 
and compare mechanisms on the degree of manipulability. 
 
The problem of designing an allocation mechanism for research facilities in university hospitals 
is de facto also an implementation problem which can be modeled as above. In this case the 
strategies available to the physicians are a choice of effort levels as suggested in the principal 
agent formulation by Myerson (1982). Moreover, part of the rules of the game are already 
provided and have similarities to the class of coordination games, such as the n-person stag-
hunt game (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977). Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) extend the n-person 
stag hunt such that each player faces an effort allocation problem and the profits are 
dependent on individual and collective effort. They show how strategic uncertainty and risk 
can lead to coordination failure. Crawford and Haller (1990) address strategies for learning 
how to cooperate in coordination games. 
 
Lastly, of relevance is the analysis regarding credence goods and supplier-induced demand (see 
e.g. Pitchik and Schotter, 1987). This occurs in markets with strong information asymmetries 
between suppliers and buyers. Consider the physician who needs to diagnose a patient (who in 
the model of Pitchik and Schotter can either have a serious or a mild affection) and faces the 
choice to either propose a thorough (expensive) treatment or a simpler (less expensive) 
treatment. In a market situation (with revenues proportional to the treatment cost) the 
physician has an interest in selling his services, and therefore may advice a thorough treatment 
even in the case of a mild affection. Pitchik and Schotter show how the percentage of fraud 
depends on the occurrence of serious and mild affections. Further they show how quality 
control, price control and expert competence affect the equilibrium. Evans (1974) gave 
empirical evidence for the occurrence of self-induced demand in the health care sector. 
Although, supplier-induced demand is in direct relation with the physician reward mechanism, 
we do not further investigate this relation in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Empirical evidence: 
incentives in Erasmus Medical 
Center Rotterdam 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we display a survey held among medical specialists in the Erasmus Medical 
Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The survey gives empirical foundation for our 
assertions on the usability of research facilities within an incentive system for physicians in 
university hospitals. We will first explain the set-up of the survey and then detail the outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 A survey among medical specialists 
 
Erasmus Medical Center is a large university hospital in the Netherlands employing over 600 
medical specialists. According to the Times Higher Education (2009) ranking it is the number 
one European institution in clinical research. We conducted a survey among medical specialists 
at Erasmus Medical Center to empirically test our hypothesis of the usability of research 
facilities within an incentive system for physicians in university hospitals. 
 
In particular we wanted to assess: 
 
1. The key-factors for the choice of physicians to work in a university hospital instead 
of a regular hospital, and the distribution of those factors. 
 
2. The key-factors that stimulate physicians in their work in a university hospital, and 
the distribution of those factors. 
 
3. The current and desired distributions of physician time spent on patient care, 
research and education. 
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In order to obtain this assessment we send out an inquiry to all 613 medical specialists in the 
Erasmus Medical Center and asked them to answer three straightforward questions: 
 
1. To what extent did the following factors play a role in your decision to work in a 
university hospital with respect to working in a regular hospital? 
 
Wage, network, (scientific) status, work level (diversity and specialization of treatments), research 
possibilities, education possibilities, expert-setting, other namely:… 
 
Each factor could be given a score from 1 to 5 depending on its impact (a 1 
corresponding to little impact, a 5 corresponding to much impact).  
 
 
2. To what extent do the following factors stimulate you in your work? 
 
Wage, network, (scientific) status, work level (diversity and specialization of treatments), research 
possibilities, education possibilities, expert-setting, other namely:… 
 
Again, each factor could be given a score from 1 to 5 depending on its impact. 
 
 
3. What is your ideal and your current distribution in time spent between patient care, 
research, and education? 
 
 
The questions were presented through an online inquiry in the period 7 July – 15 August 2009. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Results 
 
Although the survey was held during a holiday period, we had 226 respondents out of 614 
medical specialists (a response rate of 37 %), which is fairly decent. From the 226 
questionnaires 11 were not filled in completely or appropriately and therefore are omitted from 
analysis. This leaves 215 questionnaires (35 % of the population) to analyze. Figures 3.1 
through 3.5 give a graphical overview of the sample characteristics.  
 
In figure 3.1 we can see the impact characteristics of valuation factors for the decision to work 
in a university hospital. The impact of the various factors differs considerably. The level of 
work, research possibilities and an expert-setting are the most important factors whereas wage  
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Impact characteristics of valuation factors for  
the decision to work in a university hospital 
 
Avg. impact 1,85 3,00 3,39 4,36 4,00 3,48 4,40 
Mode 1 4 4 5 5 4 5 
Std. dev. 1,02 1,12 1,16 0,86 1,12 1,03 0,93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Impact characteristics of valuation factors for the decision to work in a university hospital 
 
 
is found to be the least important factor. In fact, wage is significantly lower (P < 0.0001) than 
all the other factors. Because wage is typically lower in university hospitals than in regular 
hospitals, it is logical that wage has a lower impact here. Instead, physicians choose to work in 
a university hospital because of the high specialization level, the challenging patient groups, 
and the class leading techniques and equipment (as comprised in work level), as well as the 
possibility to do research and work with colleagues that are experts in their respective fields. 
Over 75 percent of the physicians assigned these factors an impact score of 4 or 5. Work level 
and expert setting also have the smallest standard deviations, which implies there is most 
consensus among physicians regarding these categories. Network, (scientific) status and 
education possibilities seem to have a more moderate impact. Some physicians mentioned 
better possibilities for self-development, less working pressure and flexible working times as 
additional factors for their decision to work in a university hospital. Furthermore, in some 
cases individual factors, such as geographical proximity to work of partner, played a role. 
 
The decision to work in a university hospital is, however, not entirely relevant for all physicians 
because some medical disciplines are practiced only in university hospitals and not in regular  
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Impact characteristics of work stimulation factors  
 
Avg. impact 1,93 3,19 3,22 4,06 3,57 3,18 4,31 
Mode 1 3 3 4 4 3 5 
Std. dev. 0,93 1,07 1,10 0,91 1,23 1,08 0,85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Impact characteristics of work stimulation factors 
 
 
hospitals. The next question – about the impact of work stimulation factors – is relevant for all 
physicians. It also forms a validation for the outcome of the first question. The impact 
characteristics for this question are displayed in figure 3.2.  
 
The results are fairly similar to those of the first question. Again, wage has significantly (P < 
0.0001) the lowest impact among all factors. Interestingly, the standard deviation of wage is 
one of the lowest. Work level and expert setting give most stimulation and research 
possibilities again takes the third place. As before, there is most consensus among physicians 
regarding the impact of work level and an expert setting. Network, (scientific) status and 
education possibilities are again more moderate. Some physicians stated that reductions of 
research and education time lead to less stimulation, while they value congress visits. These 
results give reason to believe that incentive schemes in university hospitals should not focus on 
wage, but rather on one or more of the other stimulation factors. Over 95 percent of the 
physicians indicated they derive more work stimulus from research possibilities or scientific 
status than from wage. Research facilities therefore seem an appropriate incentive. 
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Figure 3.3: Current working time distribution over patient care, research and education 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Ideal working time distribution over patient care, research and education 
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 contain scatterplots of respectively the current and the ideal working time 
distributions over patient care, research and education.4 The second plot (figure 3.4) displays in 
dark green the physicians who have an ideal distribution with more research time than in their 
current distribution, in yellow the physicians with an ideal containing an equal part of research, 
and in red the physicians with an ideal containing a smaller part of research. The demand for 
more research time is clearly visible. 175 physicians (81 %) have an ideal with more research 
time. Note also the shift in the group average. 
 
The shift in the distribution of the group average has been decomposed in figure 3.5. 
Compared to the average current distribution the average ideal distribution sees a 3 percentage 
point increase in education and a 13 percentage point increase in research. Both shifts are 
significant (P < 0.01 and P < 0.0001 respectively) and at the dispense of time for patient care 
(which decreases with 16 percentage point). This suggests that research time – or more 
broadly: research facilities – can be used as an incentive for a considerable part of the medical 
specialists. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Average current and ideal working time distribution (bracketed values denote standard deviation) 
                                                     
 
 
 
4 Some medical specialists mentioned that their role also holds a management part which is not 
contained strictly in any of the three areas of care, research and education. 27 had assigned 
percentages which did not total up to 100 %. Their answers have been rescaled to total up to 
100 %. 
 
68% 
18% 
14% 
Average current working  
time distribution 
Care (std 19.8 %) Research (std 15.6 %)
Education (std 12.7 %)
52% 
31% 
17% 
Average ideal working  
time distribution 
Care (std 16.2 %) Research (std 15.4 %)
Education (std 9.4 %)
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Of course the ideal distribution displayed in figure 3.5 may not be directly desirable from the 
hospital’s point of view, because less patient care is not in line with its mission statement and is 
not socially justifiable. Nevertheless, the allocation of research facilities can be used as a smart 
incentive if it improves the overall university hospital performance (composed of patient care, 
research and education), leading patients to be better off as well. 
 
  
Physician Incentive Management in University Hospitals 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
  
Inducing Efficient Behavior Through the Allocation of Research Facilities 
33 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
A stylized model 
 
 
 
 
Starting our analysis, this chapter presents a stylized principal-multi-agent model for the 
allocation of research facilities to physicians in university hospitals. We will first introduce the 
framework in which we will address this problem and then proceed with a mathematical 
representation.  
 
 
 
 
4.1 The framework 
 
Consider two physicians employed at a university hospital.5 The hospital wants to perform in 
two areas: research and care6. In order to achieve performance the hospital needs input from 
its physicians. The input from the physicians is given as ‘effort in research’ and ‘effort in care’.7 
Individual effort is not directly observed, but individual performance is. Performance on care 
is a function of effort in care and depends on a parameter for ‘care-ability’. Performance on 
research is a function of effort in research and depends on parameters for ‘research-ability’ and 
‘available research facilities’. The ability parameters are private information to each physician. 
Each physician can set his effort levels independently.  
 
                                                     
 
 
 
5 Our results generalize to the case of an arbitrary number     of physicians 
6 For simplicity education is omitted as a performance area, this does not affect our results 
qualitatively 
7 Instead of interpreting the effort levels as ‘total’ levels, we may also interpret them as levels of 
‘extra’ effort which is given beyond a required base level  
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The hospital first offers the physicians a contract, which they can accept or reject. Next, the 
physicians decide simultaneously how much effort they exert. After all physicians have set their 
effort levels the physicians are rewarded with a financial compensation (a wage) and with 
research facilities. In equilibrium it holds that initially available research facilities are equal to 
those awarded at the end of the game. The mechanism by which wage and research facilities 
are awarded is known to all physicians. Physicians have a valuation for wage and research 
facilities8. Physicians may differ in their valuations depending on their individual ‘preference’. 
The valuation function, parameterized on physician preference for research facilities, is 
common over all physicians but a physician’s preference is private information to each 
physician. All physicians further incur a cost (or ‘disutility’) that is increasing with their effort.  
 
We refer to the combined ‘preference’ and ‘ability’ parameters of a physician as a physician’s 
‘type’. The valuation and cost functions can then be captured in a single utility function 
parameterized on this type. Each physician chooses his effort levels in order to maximize 
expected utility. A physician’s choice of effort levels is called a physician’s ‘strategy’. Each 
physician also has an outside utility, i.e. the utility he could obtain if he would not work for this 
hospital. 
 
The objective of the university hospital is to maximize the weighted sum of (i) total care 
performance and (ii) total research performance over physicians. Our goal is to specify an 
allocation mechanism that will maximize this objective based on the physicians’ strategies in 
equilibrium. The strategies that physicians select in equilibrium are computed by a game 
theoretic equilibrium concept (see e.g. Osborne, 2004). 
 
Based on this framework we can proceed to the mathematical model presented in the next 
section. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Formal model definition 
 
Consider a university hospital with two physicians indexed      . There are two performance 
categories: care and research, and two reward categories: wage and research facilities. Each 
                                                     
 
 
 
8 Changing the framework to incorporate a valuation for research performance instead of 
research facilities does not change our results qualitatively. 
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physician   is characterized by a type                 where           and           are 
ability-parameters for respectively care and research, and          is a valuation parameter for 
research facilities. Valuation parameters are scaled such that                  . The 
type of physician   is private information to physician  . Let   denote the set of possible types 
to each physician. By delivering effort each physician   can obtain a wage       and a share 
of research facilities         . By normalization it holds that ∑      . 
 
First, the hospital offers each physician   a contract which it can accept or reject. Next, each 
physician   simultaneously selects a level for care-effort        and research-effort       . 
Denote the effort tuple           as the strategy      of physician  , where     
 . With 
strategy    each physician   realizes a performance level                for care 9 
(parameterized on his care ability    ) and a performance level                   for 
research10 (parameterized on his research ability     and his available research facilities   ). The 
levels of effort are not directly observable and measurable, but the performance levels are. The 
performance functions are concave in effort and strictly increasing. We denote the set of all 
observable performance characteristics of all physicians under strategy profile            by 
                    . 
 
Then each physician   receives a wage    and a share of research facilities    according to an 
allocation mechanism     . Because of equilibrium, initially available research facilities are equal 
to research facilities awarded at the end of the game. If we denote with   the possible set of 
allocation outcomes such that each outcome     contains the wage    and research facilities 
   obtained by each physician   for delivering efforts     and    , the allocation mechanism 
         is such that       is the allocation outcome for strategy profile          . The 
allocation mechanism      is known ex ante to all physicians. 
 
Each physician   has a valuation             for the wage    and the research facilities    he 
obtains (parameterized on his research facilities valuation parameter   ). The valuation function 
is strictly concave and satisfies the conditions         and        , and 
   
   
  , where 
subscripts to functions denote partial derivatives. Each physician also incurs a cost for the 
efforts     and     he delivers. Combining valuation and cost we let 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
 
9 In the remainder we will occasionally use     as shorthand notation for the care performance 
            of agent    
10     is shorthand notation for the research performance                of agent   
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                                (4.1) 
 
 
denote the quasi-linear utility of outcome     to physician   with type   . This utility is such 
that outcome    is preferred to outcome    if and only if                    . Each 
physician has an outside utility  ̅          which is increasing with ability. 
 
The objective of the university hospital is to maximize hospital performance        defined 
as 
 
        ∑                ∑                ∑        (4.2) 
 
 
where   and   are weights the hospital assigns to respectively care performance and research 
performance, and           are the types of all physicians. Our goal is to specify an 
allocation mechanism      that implements the optimal outcome based on the physicians’ 
strategies in equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Solution approach 
 
We will use the following solution approach to analyze and solve the hospital’s problem within 
the context of the mathematical model described above.  
 
As a benchmark we start in chapter 5 by analyzing the hospital’s optimal decision when all 
information (including effort) is perfectly observable and can be contracted upon. Because of 
the complete contractibility the resulting contract is called a complete contract. In particular, this 
first step gives us what is called the first-best contract in principal-agent theory. We also do this 
for the case that the current wage system is left intact. For ease of analysis we separately 
consider homogeneous physicians before proceeding to heterogeneous physicians.  
 
The derived complete contracts constitute the mechanism design concept of a social choice 
function. A social choice function       , where   is the set of possible physician types, and 
  the set of possible outcomes, is a representation of the desirable outcome for every set of 
physician types. The social choice function is important because once we have a social choice 
function we can look for a mechanism that implements it. That is, for a group equilibrium 
strategy concept   which associates with type set     , the set of strategies     , that are 
equilibrium or stationary strategies for all physicians, we can look for an outcome function   
which translates strategies into outcomes such that for all      the outcome         is 
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identical to the outcome      of the social choice function. This relation is represented 
graphically in figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Relation social choice function and mechanism 
 
 
The derivation of the optimal mechanism that implements the complete contracts is given in 
chapter 6. Because in this chapter the complete observability of effort is dropped, the resulting 
contracts are called incomplete contracts. Physician types are still considered to be perfectly 
observable. We pay particular attention to the consequences of ignoring heterogeneity and we 
give a comparison of the optimal contracts with the ‘current’ contracts. 
 
In chapter 7 we extent to the case that information on physician types is not observable, but 
instead must be revealed through physicians. This requires the formulation of specific 
conditions for truthful revelation and the derivation of a new complete contract. The 
conditions on the optimal incentive system follow. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Complete contracts 
 
 
 
 
We first analyze a benchmark scenario where complete contractibility is possible. Complete 
contractibility implies a complete and exact agreement can be made on the delivered effort and 
on the rewarded wage and research facilities. The pool of workers is considered fixed. Under a 
complete contract a physician’s wage consists only of a base salary and his available research 
facilities consist only of a base endowment. A physician’s effort levels are precisely specified; 
there is no variability. In order to clearly examine the relevant aspects of the contracts, we 
distinguish two situations: (i) homogeneous physicians and (ii) heterogeneous physicians. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Homogeneous physicians 
 
Consider a hospital with two homogeneous physicians. As now       we omit the type 
parameterization in the functions below for ease of exposition. The hospital’s optimization 
problem is: 
 
 
           ∑         
 
   ∑           ∑  
 
 
 
 (5.1) 
 
 
subject to the individual rationality (or participation) constraints: 
 
 
                        ̅       (5.2) 
 
 
and the research facilities constraint: 
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∑    
 
  (5.3) 
 
 
For                and         . 
 
The first-best levels of effort, wage and research facilities are described in Proposition 5.1. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 5.1 [Complete contract with homogeneous physicians]   
 
A complete contract for homogeneous physician’s is optimal if and only if it has the following 
properties: 
 
1. Effort levels of each physician are strictly positive and equal over physicians. The 
optimal effort levels equate the marginal benefit to the hospital in both performance 
categories to the marginal cost of effort relative to the marginal physician valuation 
for extra wage: 
 
                        
 
         
 
 
2. All research facilities are allocated and each physician holds an equal share of research 
facilities: 
 
   
 
 
        
 
3. The wage makes each physician indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
contract, given the optimal levels of effort and research facilities: 
 
    
    ̅                     
------------------------- 
 
 
The proof is given in the appendix. 
 
The complete contract sets effort levels that maximize the joint surplus. Utility is equal for all 
physicians. Through the allocation of research facilities the hospital boosts research 
performance, and is able to pay a lower wage to the physicians than without the allocation of 
research facilities. This is the basic situation in university hospitals, where a lower wage is paid 
than in regular hospitals. 
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It is interesting to see what happens if the current wage system is left intact and only the 
research facilities allocation system can be changed. This situation has more practical relevance 
as changing wages is likely to encounter resistance from physicians (if wage is lowered) or from 
society (if substantial financial stimulation is introduced). Moreover, from chapter 3 we have 
learned that research facilities are likely to have more impact than wage as an incentive within 
university hospitals. 
 
We therefore take the current wage levels as given. We suppose they are predetermined at 
separate levels      . We assume theses wages are feasible in the sense that they allow at 
least one possible allocation of research facilities in which none of the participation constraints 
is violated. The properties of the optimal contract now change. In particular, the optimal 
allocation of research facilities is not equal over physicians, as can be seen from Proposition 
5.2. 
 
  
PROPOSITION 5.2 [Complete contract with homogeneous physicians and 
predetermined wage]   
 
If wages are predetermined at different – but feasible – levels, a complete contract for 
homogeneous physicians is optimal if and only if it has the following properties: 
 
1. Effort levels of each physician are strictly positive. For each physician the optimal 
effort levels equate the marginal benefit to the hospital in both performance 
categories: 
 
                         
 
2. The total of contracted effort makes each physician indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the contract, given the optimal levels of research facilities and the 
predetermined wage: 
 
                  ̅        
 
 
3. All research facilities are allocated and the allocation is such that the net marginal 
benefit of allocating research facilities to a physician is equal over all physicians: 
 
         
 
where 
 
                                            
 
 
(5.4) 
------------------------- 
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Again, the proof is given in the appendix.  
 
In this case effort levels are only equal for all physicians if there are sufficient research facilities 
to offset the utility differences caused by the wage differences. Otherwise, physicians with a 
higher wage are contracted to deliver more effort. The distribution of effort over care and 
research is such that the marginal benefits to the hospital for care and research are equal. 
Moreover, research facilities are allocated so as to create most benefit, which means the 
marginal allocation benefit must be equal over all physicians. This marginal allocation benefit is 
composed of a direct component resulting from the ‘use’ of research facilities (the first term in 
(5.4)), and an indirect component resulting from the effort that can be induced with research 
facilities (the second term in (5.4)).  
 
Note that the marginal allocation benefit also represents the shadow price of research facilities, 
i.e. the marginal increase in performance if more research facilities are made available. This 
gives the optimality condition when the total of available research facilities is freely 
determinable (e.g. the budget for research facilities is not predetermined): the marginal cost of 
providing research facilities should then be equated to the marginal allocation benefit. 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Heterogeneous physicians 
 
Consider next the heterogeneous case in which the physicians differ in ability. We have two 
heterogeneous physicians, with each physician   having type   . The full form hospital 
optimization problem is now given by: 
 
             ∑             
 
   ∑               
 
 ∑  
 
 
(5.5) 
 
subject to the individual rationality constraints: 
 
 
                             ̅                (5.6) 
 
 
and the research facilities constraint: 
 
∑    
 
  (5.7) 
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For                and         . 
 
We omit the case where wage is undetermined and consider immediately the interesting case 
where the current wage system is left unaffected and only the research facilities allocation 
system is introduced. The wages are fixed at predetermined – possibly separate – levels. The 
optimal levels of effort and research facilities are then described in Proposition 5.3 which is 
similar to Proposition 5.2. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 5.3 [Complete contract with heterogeneous physicians and 
predetermined wage]   
 
If wages are predetermined at different – but feasible – levels, a complete contract for 
heterogeneous physicians is optimal if and only if it has the following properties: 
 
1. Effort levels of each physician are strictly positive. For each physician the optimal 
effort levels equate the marginal benefit to the hospital in both performance 
categories: 
 
                                        
 
2. The total of contracted effort makes each physician indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting the contract, given the optimal levels of research facilities and the 
predetermined wage: 
 
                     ̅                 
 
3. All research facilities are allocated and the allocation is such that the net marginal 
benefit of allocating research facilities to a physician is equal over all physicians: 
 
                 
 
where 
 
                                                           
 
 
(5.8) 
------------------------- 
 
The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 5.2, except for parameterization in the 
functions.  
 
The dependency of the optimal complete contract on physician ability is that physicians who 
are better in care than in research, are contracted to do relatively more care than research, and 
vice versa (property 1 of Proposition 5.3). Furthermore, the higher a physician’s abilities, the 
more research facilities he receives. An experienced professor therefore optimally obtains more 
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research facilities than a starting physician. Research facilities allocation is also influenced by 
research facilities valuation, with physicians with a higher valuation receiving more facilities. 
The inducement effect is larger for these physicians, i.e. they are willing to work harder for the 
same amount of research facilities. Finally, when a physician receives more research facilities, 
he will also be contracted to deliver more effort. 
 
Note that even if the wage system was not predetermined, the allocation of research facilities 
would still be related to care performance – the expression for the marginal allocation benefit 
of research facilities remains unchanged. The only real difference between the two scenario’s is 
the marginal benefit to the hospital in each performance category (property 1). If the wage 
system is not predetermined these marginal benefits are equated to the marginal cost of effort 
relative to the marginal physician valuation for extra wage (just as we have seen in Proposition 
5.1). 
 
The contract described by Proposition 5.3 holds some perverse incentives if physicians would 
have to reveal to reveal their type in order to implement the contract (recall that physician 
types are actually private information to the physicians). By pretending to have a lower 
research facilities valuation, physicians could obtain a higher utility. To see why this holds, note 
that the contract wants to equate the utility of all physicians to their outside utility  ̅ . If 
physicians report their true types their utility will indeed be equated to  ̅ . However, if a 
physician lies about his type, and claims he has a higher valuation than he actually has, he will 
be contracted to deliver more effort and receive more research facilities. However, as the 
amount of extra research facilities is computed based on his revealed (higher) type, and not on 
his true (lower) type, the extra research facilities will not be enough to offset the costs of extra 
effort. Hence, the physician will obtain a utility level below  ̅. The reverse holds if a physician 
claims to have a lower valuation than he actually has, he will then obtain a utility level above  ̅. 
Should physicians also have to reveal their ability, they will be inclined to pretend to have a 
higher ability. Therefore the contract will induce physicians to lie about their type.  
 
It becomes evident now that – under private information – contracts need to satisfy another 
condition: incentive compatibility. Indeed, it is not at all trivial how to implement contracts 
with this condition. We will treat this matter in chapter 7. In the next chapter we will first 
extend the contracts to the more realistic scenario in which effort is not contractible. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Incomplete contracts 
 
 
 
 
We now proceed to the scenario where physician effort is not completely contracted upon. 
Instead, the physicians receive a reward proportional to their performance and they choose 
their effort levels strategically as in a game. Now incentives begin to play a role. We again 
distinguish the situations that physician types are equal, and that physician types are unequal.  
 
 
 
 
6.1 Homogeneous physicians 
 
As before we have two homogeneous physicians. And as       we omit the type 
parameterization in the functions below for ease of exposition. We consider again the case that 
wage is predetermined (the original wage system is left intact), so that    is a constant for each 
physician  . 
 
We need the following definition. 
 
 
DEFINITION 6.1  [(Strictly) concave allocation mechanism] 
 
An allocation mechanism      through which the research facilities    of physician   are 
determined by     
      with        a concave function is called a concave allocation 
mechanism. It is called a strictly concave allocation mechanism if the function        is strictly 
concave. 
------------------------- 
 
 
Recall that in the first stage of the game the hospital offers the physicians a contract which 
they can accept or reject. In the next stage the physicians decide on the level of effort they 
exert. We solve the contract design problem of the hospital by backward induction, starting 
with the physician’s choice of effort levels. 
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Physician’s problem  
 
Given the strategy    of physician    , and given a concave allocation mechanism      
through which the research facilities    of physician   are determined by     
      ,    being 
the set of all performance characteristics of all physicians under strategy profile          , 
every physician   faces the problem: 
 
 
                            (6.1) 
 
 
subject to the allocation constraint: 
 
    
         (6.2) 
 
 
For             and         . 
 
Solving the above problem yields the conditions for the best response of physician   to the 
strategy of the other physician. This leads to the following Lemma. 
 
 
LEMMA 6.1 [Best response function for homogeneous physicians and predetermined 
wage] 
 
In the case of homogeneous physicians and predetermined wage, the best response function  
    (  ) of a physician   under a concave allocation mechanism            to the strategy    
of the other physician, is given by: 
 
    (  )    
  
 
where   
      
     
   is such that the marginal reward (in terms of utility) to care effort, as well 
as the marginal reward to research effort, multiplied with a performance boost from extra 
research facilities, is equal to the marginal cost of effort. I.e.   
  satisfies: 
 
                  
 
where 
 
                  
                 
 
                  
                    
 
(6.3) 
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------------------------- 
 
 
For proof, see the appendix. 
 
In Lemma 6.1     and     denote the marginal valuation for extra research facilities 
multiplied with the marginal return (in terms of research facilities) to respectively care effort 
and research effort.     denotes a self-multiplication factor for research facilities. Note that 
this self-multiplication factor (      
            )
  
, represents the snowball effect in the 
allocation of research facilities (because of their contribution to research performance). In 
determining their effort levels the physicians take this performance boost in account.  
 
If the hospital has installed individual incentives, the physician’s research facilities increase with 
his effort. However, if the hospital gives team or relative incentives, the efforts of the other 
physician affect physician  ’s outcome. Therefore the best response function will depend on 
the strategy of the other physician. If the allocation mechanism is strictly concave, the best 
response function is injective, i.e. for every strategy of the other physician each physician has 
one unique best response strategy. Besides the benefits of extra research facilities, there is also 
a cost of providing effort. The optimal effort levels equate these benefits and costs at the 
margin. Note that wage plays no role in the physicians problem, as we have assumed that 
research facilities valuation is independent of wage. 
 
We now proceed to the hospital’s maximization problem. 
 
 
 
Hospital’s problem 
 
The hospital’s optimization problem is: 
 
 
              ∑         
 
   ∑        
       ∑  
 
 
 
 (6.4) 
 
 
subject to the individual rationality constraints which are required for the physicians to accept 
the contract: 
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                ̅       (6.5) 
 
 
the research facilities constraint: 
 
∑        
 
  (6.6) 
 
 
and the four equilibrium constraints from the best response function described by (6.3). 
 
It turns out that the hospital can achieve the effort and profit levels of the optimal complete 
contract described by Proposition 5.2. The required incentive scheme is described by 
Proposition 6.1.  
 
 
PROPOSITION 6.1 [Incomplete contract with homogeneous physicians and 
predetermined wage] 
 
When effort cannot be contracted, but performance can, and when wages are predetermined at 
different – but feasible – levels, the optimal incomplete contract for homogeneous physicians 
consists of relative incentives and a base allocation of research facilities.  
 
Optimal relative incentives for research performance are described by: 
 
    
       
 
   
 (6.7) 
 
and optimal relative incentives for care performance are described by: 
 
    
       
 
       
   
 
   
 
    
   
  (6.8) 
 
where    is as described by (5.4) and     is as described by (6.3). 
 
The level of the base allocation follows from the participation constraints (6.5). 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
The proof is in the appendix. 
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The hospital can obtain maximum profits by including relative incentives in the contract. In 
the optimum, the incentives are chosen such that every physician delivers optimal effort, given 
that the other physicians deliver optimal effort (Nash equilibrium). The contract is ex ante 
budget balanced, i.e. in expectation the research facilities allocation constraint (6.6) is satisfied.  
 
The incentives for research performance are increasing with the research performance of the 
other physician. The reason is that we want to equate the marginal allocation benefit of 
research facilities over physicians, as we have seen in the complete contract (Proposition 5.2). 
If one physician delivers more effort and earns more research facilities this decreases his 
marginal allocation benefit. Hence, as the other physician now has a relatively higher marginal 
allocation benefit, his research facilities incentives should be increased. This incentive structure 
has the advantage that it encourages the support of co-workers. The same holds for incentives 
for care performance. Care incentives, however, also decrease with the physician’s own 
research efforts. This makes the allocation rule strictly concave in performance. This concavity 
was required for solving the physician’s choice of effort problem. 
 
The non-linear shape of the allocation rule has two disadvantages. First, deriving the closed 
form of the allocation rule is difficult (if not impossible). Second, the non-intuitivity of the rule 
makes selling the contract to physicians difficult. However, the contract can easily be turned 
into a linear contract with individual incentives by evaluating the relevant terms at the optimal 
levels described in Proposition 5.2. This linear contract with individual incentives will lead to 
the same profits and is also ex ante budget balanced. It is of the form: 
 
 
             
     
           
     
         
   (6.9) 
 
 
where     
     
   and     
     
   are as described in Proposition 6.1 but evaluated in the optimum 
characteristics derived from Proposition 5.2, and where   
  is the base allocation following 
from the participation constraints (6.5). Note that a physician’s wage plays no role beyond the 
determination of the base allocation. 
 
The linear contract with individual incentives has the added benefit that it constitutes a 
dominant strategy equilibrium, which is stronger than Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it 
eliminates the concern about multiplicativity of equilibria (multiple Nash equilibria might exist; 
there is only one dominant strategy equilibrium). 
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6.2 Heterogeneous physicians 
 
In the case of heterogeneous physicians the derivation of the optimal incomplete contract is 
analogous to the homogeneous case. Therefore we omit the rigorous presentation of the 
heterogeneous problems and proceed directly to the results. As we will see the general 
concepts of the contract remain the same. There are however several particular effects of 
heterogeneity that we will discuss. In addition to the optimal incomplete contract under the 
current wage system we present two other scenarios. The first scenario examines the 
consequences of ignoring heterogeneity. The second scenario examines the situation in which 
research facilities allocation is only based on research performance and there is no coupling 
with care performance (which reflects the current situation). 
 
First, the best response function for heterogeneous physicians is described in Lemma 6.2. 
 
 
LEMMA 6.2 [Best response function for heterogeneous physicians and predetermined 
wage] 
 
In the case of heterogeneous physicians and predetermined wage, the best response function  
    (  ) of a physician   under a concave allocation mechanism     
       to the strategy    
of the other physician, is given by: 
 
    (  )    
  
 
where   
      
     
   is such that the marginal reward (in terms of utility) to care effort, as well 
as the marginal reward to research effort, multiplied with a performance boost from extra 
research facilities, is equal to the marginal cost of effort. I.e.   
  satisfies: 
 
                                  
 
where 
 
                         
                     
 
                         
                        
 
        
 
      
                      
 
 
(6.10) 
------------------------- 
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Heterogeneity has three effects on a physician’s optimal effort levels. First, when a physician’s 
ability in either care or research increases he finds it optimal to exert more effort in that 
category. Second, when a physician’s ability in research increases the performance boost from 
research facilities     increases and hence the physician will find it optimal to exert more 
effort in general (in both effort categories). Third, the optimal effort levels increase with 
valuation for research facilities. This last effect represents the fact that physicians who have 
more valuation for research facilities are willing to work harder to obtain them. 
 
In the previous stage of the game the hospital optimally offers the physicians the contract 
described by Proposition 6.2. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 6.2 [Incomplete contract with heterogeneous physicians and 
predetermined wage] 
 
When effort cannot be contracted, but performance can, and when wages are predetermined at 
different – but feasible – levels, the optimal incomplete contract for heterogeneous physicians 
consists of relative incentives and a base allocation of research facilities.  
 
Optimal relative incentives for research performance are described by: 
 
    
       
 
       
 (6.11) 
 
and optimal relative incentives for care performance are described by: 
 
    
       
 
               
   
 
       
 
    
   
  
 (6.12) 
 
where        is as described by (5.8) and         is as described by (6.10). 
 
The level of the base allocation follows from the participation constraints (6.5). 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
Heterogeneity affects the optimal incomplete contract as follows. Care ability has no effect on 
incentives, it only increases the base allocation. Research ability affects care incentives and the 
base allocation, which both increase with ability. The research ability of the other physician, 
however, has a negative effect on both care and research incentives. Hence, it pays to be better 
in research than the other physician. Both care and research incentives are further influenced 
negatively by research facilities valuation of the other physician.  
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Just as in the homogeneous case, the contract can be turned into a linear contract with 
individual incentives. The form is identical to (6.9). 
 
Incentive compatibility still is an issue, should the contract be extended to the case of private 
information. Physicians can obtain higher utilities by pretending to have higher ability or 
higher valuation11. If they do, they will deliver less than optimal effort. 
 
 
 
Ignoring heterogeneity 
 
It is interesting to examine the consequences of ignoring heterogeneity. This will allow us to 
identify the real impact of heterogeneity on the optimal contracts. 
 
If heterogeneity is ignored, all physicians are offered the same contract, which is specified in 
Proposition 6.1. Let us assume the standardized homogeneous type is an average of the 
heterogeneous types. Physicians, however, will set their effort levels according to condition 
(6.10) which is based on their type. As a result the following equilibrium conditions hold: 
 
 
                      
 
 
These conditions correspond to the third property of Proposition 5.3 (marginal allocation 
benefit), but in contrast to the optimal conditions they do not equate marginal allocation 
benefit over physicians. Instead they equate the marginal allocation benefit of a physician to 
the computed marginal allocation benefit of the standardized homogenous type under the 
optimal complete contract for homogeneous physicians. It is clear that the optimality 
conditions are not satisfied and the hospital performance is suboptimal. 
 
Further comparison with the optimum reveals that the participation constraint will no longer 
be binding. In the optimum the utility of physicians is equal to their outside utility, but if 
heterogeneity is not taken in account physicians with lower abilities than the standardized 
                                                     
 
 
 
11 This is a difference with the optimal complete contract, where physicians could do better by 
pretending to have a lower valuation. This difference arises because physicians can now choose 
their effort levels themselves. 
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homogeneous type will make a rent – they profit from a higher base allocation and higher 
incentives – whereas physicians with higher abilities will obtain a lower utility – they have a 
lower base allocation and lower incentives than they should have. The same holds with respect 
to research facilities valuation. 
 
Therefore, if heterogeneity is ignored, retention of physicians – especially higher talented 
physicians – becomes a problem. If ability is verifiable, e.g. through tests and exams or just 
over time in practice, but research facilities valuation is ignored, the hospital will have difficulty 
retaining physicians with higher valuations. Over time this will reduce the power of research 
facilities incentives. Hence, ignoring heterogeneity erodes hospital performance both directly 
(through setting suboptimal incentives) and indirectly (as the most talented and the most keen 
to work physicians may be lost). 
 
 
 
The ‘current’ situation 
 
In the ‘current’ situation there is no coupling between research facilities allocation and care 
performance. We will examine the differences between the optimal incentive system in this 
current situation and the optimal incentive system we have derived earlier. We demonstrate 
that not coupling research facilities allocation to care performance is not optimal. 
 
In case research facilities are only allocated in response to research performance, the optimal 
allocation rule is of the form: 
 
            
     
         
  
 
where  
 
    
       
 
       
 
 
 
As we have implied, there are no incentives for care performance through research facilities 
allocation. Therefore, in the absence of other incentives for care, hospital care performance 
will be suboptimal. In fact, without incentives, economic theory predicts that the effort levels 
in care are zero. 
 
This means, however, that due to the participation constraint (which binds in the optimum): 
 
                     ̅                
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the efforts delivered in research are higher than under the optimal incentive system we have 
derived. Also, because research facilities are only allocated in response to research 
performance, more research facilities will be allocated to the physicians who have high research 
ability. This means that the boost in research performance that can be achieved through 
research facilities, is maximal in the ‘current’ situation. Yet, the impact of this extra research 
performance does not outweigh the impact of inducement of care efforts which we see in the 
optimal incentive system. Hospital performance is highest under the optimal incentive system 
we have derived. 
 
Naturally, because the optimal incentive system we have derived rewards care performance 
more than in the current situation, physicians with higher care ability will benefit under our 
optimal incentive system (in terms or research facilities). However, these physicians will also 
have to work harder. Physicians who are better in research will be allowed to take it easier. As a 
result all physicians will be equally well off under our optimal incentive system as they are in 
the current situation. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Contracts under private 
information 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters we had assumed the hospital has perfect information. The hospital 
could verify how able each physician was in care and in research, and identify each physician’s 
valuation for research facilities. Although it is likely that ability scores may be obtained through 
tests and exams or over time through examination on the work floor, this is not so likely for 
research facilities valuation. Therefore, in this chapter, we step away from the assumption of 
perfect information and impose that research facilities valuation must be revealed through 
physicians. We derive the conditions which the optimal incentive system should satisfy in this 
case. 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Incentive compatibility 
 
When information is private and physicians need to reveal how competent they are and how 
much valuation for research facilities they possess, it is only natural that they will try to reveal 
their characteristics in such a way that they will be best off. If, for example, physicians could 
obtain a higher payoff if their abilities are higher, they will try to claim to have a high ability. 
Now, because of tests, exams and observation in practice, it is generally not possible for a 
physician to pretend to have a higher ability than he really has. However, he could pretend to 
be worse. Of course no physician would do so unless pretending to have a worse ability would 
result in a higher payoff. Therefore, when the contract includes payoffs that are increasing with 
ability, the physicians have no incentive to lie about their type. The contract is called incentive 
compatible. 
 
Although incentive compatibility is relatively straightforward for information on physician 
ability, it is not so for information on physician valuation for research facilities. In an inquiry or 
in a negotiation procedure, a physician could claim to have either a higher or lower valuation 
than he really has. Therefore, if the contract includes payoffs that are increasing with physician 
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valuation for research facilities, all physicians will pretend to have a high valuation. Achieving 
incentive compatibility for research facilities valuation therefore requires specific constraints on 
the contract. 
 
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints imply that a physician’s utility is maximized when 
he reveals his true type and given that the other physicians reveal their true type (Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium). Their derivation is as follows. Consider the utility function of a physician  : 
 
 
                            
 
 
The hospital offers the physician a contract in which his research facilities and his effort levels 
are determined by the valuation parameters revealed by all physicians, as well as their ability 
scores. In this case, where we have two physicians, we denote the revealed type parameters 
with   ̂ and   ̂ and obtain: 
 
 
  (   ̂   )   (        ̂   ̂    )        ̂   ̂        ̂   ̂  (7.1) 
 
 
The hospital should offer a contract    (  ̂   ̂)    (  ̂   ̂)       ̂   ̂   that maximizes (7.1) for  
  ̂     and given that   ̂    . Differentiating (7.1) with respect to    ̂ and evaluating in    we 
obtain the first order condition for a utility function that is maximized when the physician 
reveals his true type: 
 
 
  (               )  
          
   
 
           
   
 
           
   
   (7.2) 
 
 
This is the incentive compatibility constraint for physician  . 
 
By including the incentive compatibility constraints in our problem, we may restrict attention 
to the case where physician’s truthfully report their type. This is known as the revelation 
principle (Myerson, 1981 and 1982). It eliminates the need to consider strategic behavior and 
lying. We can now maximize the expected hospital performance over all possible physician 
types. 
 
We present the full problem in the next section. 
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7.2 Contract design with private information 
 
As before, we have two heterogeneous physicians, with each physician   having type    
             and a predetermined wage   . We assume the ability scores for care     and for 
research     are known, but research facilities valuation    is not. We further assume the 
hospital can derive the probability distribution function      of the valuation parameters. The 
full form hospital optimization problem is now given by: 
 
 
                
 ∬ (  ∑                  
 
   ∑  (                        )
 
)         (  )       
 
 
 
(7.3) 
 
 
subject to the individual rationality constraints: 
 
 
 (               )                         ̅                
         
(7.4) 
 
 
the incentive compatibility constraints: 
 
 
  (               )  
          
   
 
           
   
 
           
   
   
      
    
            
(7.5) 
 
 
and the research facilities constraint: 
 
∑           
 
     
            
(7.6) 
 
 
For                  
  and            
 . 
 
This problem is substantially more difficult than the problems in chapters 5 and 6. It can be 
solved however, by using the calculus of variations. The resulting conditions on the optimal 
contract are described by Proposition 7.1. 
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PROPOSITION 7.1 [Optimal contract under private information]   
 
If research facilities valuation is private information and if wages are predetermined, the 
optimal contract for heterogeneous physicians has the following properties: 
 
1. Effort levels of each physician are strictly positive. For each physician the effort levels 
equate the marginal benefit to the hospital in both performance categories: 
 
                                (    (     )        ) 
 
2. Physicians are allowed to make a rent so that their utility is higher than their outside 
utility:  
 
 (               )                         ̅                
            
 
3. All research facilities are allocated and the allocation is such that the net marginal 
benefit of allocating research facilities to a physician is equal over all physicians: 
 
                            
 
where 
 
                   (  )     (   (     )   (     )    ) 
      (     (     )   )  
   (     )
   
         (   (     )    )  
   
 
   
(        (     )             (   (     )    ) ) 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
The proof is in the appendix. 
 
In the optimum the hospital offers the physicians a contract based on the valuation for 
research facilities the physicians reveal. The offered contracts are such that it is optimal for 
physicians to reveal their true valuation provided that the other physicians reveal their true 
valuation. As usual, the revelation of information is costly. Therefore the hospital can no 
longer obtain effort levels that are as high as the contracts in chapters 5 and 6. In order for the 
hospital to achieve optimal profits, the hospital must now not claim all surplus and allow the 
physicians to obtain a higher utility than they could elsewhere. As before, the contracted levels 
of effort balance the marginal profits to the hospital in care and research. The allocation rule 
for research facilities is such that all research facilities are allocated (at least in expectation), no 
matter what types the physicians reveal. Furthermore, research facilities are allocated such that 
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they equate the marginal allocation benefit over physicians. This is similar to the optimal 
contracts from chapter 5, only the marginal allocation benefit is now computed differently due 
to the incentive compatibility constraint. The first term represents the direct increase in 
research performance that results from efficient resource utilization (increases with research 
ability). The second term represents the increase in inducement effect if physician valuation 
increases. The last term dampens this inducement benefit in the final allocation, so that it is 
not profitable for physicians to deviate from their true type. 
 
Although we could now proceed to give a formula for the incomplete version of the contract, 
it is not very meaningful. The functions that relate contracted effort and allocated research 
facilities to the revealed valuation are dependent on the performance and valuation functions 
through a system of differential equations. Hence, they are not explicit and neither is any 
incentive mechanism that depends on them. If, however, the performance functions and 
valuation functions are known, the explicit functions for contracted effort and allocated 
research facilities can be derived, and so can a meaningful formula for the incomplete contract. 
This is powerful as it allows to construct the optimal incentive system for given valuation and 
performance functions. 
 
In the next chapter we will discuss how our theoretical results obtained in this chapter and in 
the previous two chapters extend to practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Incentive management: 
from theory to practice 
 
 
 
 
The theoretical contracts designed in this thesis describe the optimal incentive system within a 
fairly generally modeled setting of university hospitals. In this chapter we discuss how the 
theoretical contracts extend to practice. We first present a brief summary of our most 
important results. We then formulate the steps involved towards implementation. We also 
discuss the conditions under which it is profitable for a university hospital to implement a 
research facilities based incentive system. 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Overview of main theoretical results 
 
Table 8.1 summarizes the main theoretical results achieved in this thesis.  
 
Summary of main results of chapters 5, 6 and 7 
Complete  
contracts 
 Compared to regular hospitals, research facilities allocation allows university 
hospitals to pay lower wages 
 Optimal contracts balance, for each physician, his effort distribution over care 
and research such that the marginal benefit of effort to the hospital in both 
categories is equal 
 The hospital optimally allocates all research facilities 
 Research facilities are optimally allocated such that they equate the marginal 
allocation benefit over physicians: this is a balance between resource utilization 
and inducement effects 
 The optimal level of available research facilities equates the marginal cost of 
research facilities to the marginal allocation benefit. 
 Contracted effort levels increase with ability and with valuation 
 Allocated research facilities also increase with ability and valuation 
 
Incomplete   Physicians like to deliver most effort in the category they are best at 
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contracts  Physicians with higher valuations are willing to work harder 
 If effort cannot be contracted, but performance can, the hospital can achieve 
optimal effort levels by offering contracts composed of a base allocation and 
relative incentives Nash equilibrium 
 The optimal incomplete contract can be linearized and turned into a contract 
with individual incentives Dominant strategy equilibrium 
 Expected budget balance holds 
 The base allocation is increasing with ability 
 Incentives are increasing with research ability 
 Incentives are decreasing in valuation of the other physicians 
 Incentives are increasing in the performance of the other physicians 
 Ignoring heterogeneity leads to suboptimal performance and compromises 
retention of physicians 
 The current situation does not provide sufficient inducement of care 
performance, but could foster a higher research performance if incentives are set 
optimally 
 Optimal incentive system gives higher total hospital performance than in the 
current situation 
 
Contracts under  
private information 
 Holds when valuation is private, but abilities can be observed 
 If rewards are increasing in valuation, physicians are inclined to lie 
 Incentive compatibility ensures truthful implementation of contracts  
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium 
 Optimal contracts balance, for each physician, his effort distribution over care 
and research such that the marginal benefit of effort to the hospital in both 
categories is equal 
 Physicians are allowed to make a rent compared to their outside utility 
 Marginal allocation benefit is equated over physicians 
 Expected budget balance holds 
 Revelation of information is costly lower total performance 
 Optimal incentive system can be constructed for given production and 
valuation functions 
 
Table 8.1: Summary of main results of chapters 5, 6 and 7 
 
 
In our analysis we have deliberately imposed that the current wage system remains intact. This 
brings our results closer to short term implementability. Also the model is deliberately kept as 
simple as possible, whilst including the most practically relevant aspects. The basic 
dependencies revealed through the models are recognizable and realistic. Most of the results 
are also intuitive. Only the exact formulas required for optimal contracts become quite 
complex as we introduce more realism. This is an obstacle for practical implementation. Yet, 
there are ways to overcome at least some of these obstacles. We will come back to this in the 
next section. 
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8.2 Extensions to practice 
 
In chapter 1 we presented an overview of the phases in the design process of incentive 
management and the various steps per phase (figure 1.1). We will now reflect on how this 
thesis has dealt with these activities. We describe what has been done, and what is still left 
open. Furthermore, we examine the steps involved towards implementation and discuss how 
some of the problems in extending the theoretical results to practice can be overcome. 
 
Strategic rationale 
In this thesis we have defined the strategic rationale behind incentives for university hospitals 
(as captured in the hospital performance function). For extensions to practice it is, however, 
important that clear strategic, tactical and practical goals are set immediately. Our results leave 
room for a precise definition of such goals.  
 
Assess incentive possibilities 
Through discussions with involved health care professionals and an inquiry held at a large 
regional university hospital, we have identified that significant support for research facilities 
incentives exist. There is significantly more support for such incentives than for financial 
incentives. We have specified several potential concepts for research facilities – including OR 
time for clinical trials, research budgets, time for congress visits, traineeships and seminars – 
but a more precise identification of which research facilities are desired has to be done in order 
to extend our results to practice. 
 
Identify system dynamics and determine class of incentive system 
We presented a principal-multi-agent model that captures the most important system 
dynamics. Physicians need to perform in both care and research, are heterogeneous in ability 
and valuation, and have private information regarding their type. We showed how the tradeoff 
between resource utilization of research facilities and inducement effects is captured within an 
optimal incentive system. There are, however, also dynamics that we did not consider. 
Coordination between physicians for example, also plays a role, as does altruism (i.e. the 
extend to which physicians care about the utility of other physicians or of patients). Dur and 
Sol (2008) show how team and relative incentives can stimulate social interaction when 
altruism is present. Social interaction in turn can help solve coordination problems. Because 
these issues have been examined in other literature, we have chosen to pay particular focus to 
the unique effects of the two performance categories and the resource utilization versus 
inducement tradeoff. 
 
Design incentive mechanism 
We have designed an incentive system that is optimal with respect to our framework. The 
results have been summarized in table 8.1. The results give good insight in the rules by which 
an incentive system should be ideally designed. The framework is of course an abstraction 
from reality designed to examine the effects of research facilities allocation on hospital 
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performance. In reality, factors that were not included in our framework play a role. We have 
mentioned coordination and altruism. Uncertainty is another factor. Combining our new 
results with results from existing work on coordination, altruism and uncertainty therefore is 
an important next step towards implementation. 
 
Assess equilibrium and emergent behavior 
The conditions for optimal contracts we have specified constitute either a Nash equilibrium 
(incomplete contracts with relative incentives), a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (contracts under 
private information) or a dominant strategy equilibrium (linearized incomplete contract with 
individual incentives). A dominant strategy equilibrium is the strongest game theoretical 
equilibrium concept, and, importantly, is unique. A (Bayesian-)Nash equilibrium is, however, 
no weird notion in an environment in which physicians have a general idea or expectation of 
the actions of the other physicians, and can learn of and examine each other’s actions 
dynamically. Clear communication can help coordinate to the desired (Bayesian-)Nash 
equilibrium. Further patterns on emergent behavior can be evaluated in a field experiment. 
 
Remaining steps 
Remaining steps towards implementation include obtaining more information on the desired 
research facilities and estimation of the valuation functions. This can be achieved by setting up 
a larger questionnaire and by using, for example, non-linear regression. Relevant performance 
criteria need to be identified based on the strategic, tactical and practical goals, and the ‘right’ 
physicians – those responsible for the performance measures – need to be selected for 
inclusion in the incentive scheme. Care is required in selecting performance criteria because of 
negative externalities, in particular because of the effects of self-induced demand. Performance 
measures can be quantifiable or subjective and may differ over physicians. An important 
technique for processing and comparing performance levels is data envelopment analysis. 
Dependent on the contract the hospital wants to construct, (parts of) the performance 
functions need to be estimated. This is again possible through, for example, non linear 
regression. Finally, social and legal implications need to be assessed and a field experiment may 
be set up and evaluated. 
 
Complications and practical alternatives 
Although the optimal contracts are theoretically valuable, their complexity may, as mentioned, 
be a complication for practical implementation. In particular a contract that accounts for 
incentive compatibility may become complex as the valuation functions and performance 
functions turn out to be complex. An incentive compatible contract sets up a sustainable 
environment with respect to the retention of physicians and the working of incentives. A 
practical alternative may, however, be found in the linearized incomplete contract with 
individual incentives for heterogeneous physicians. Physicians should then periodically reveal 
their valuation (e.g. through periodical negotiation or evaluation interviews) and are offered the 
incentive scheme based on their revealed valuation. If, however, their performance levels in the 
subsequent period deviate too much from the optimal performance levels computed with their 
revealed valuation, their incentive contract is adjusted accordingly. Parkes (2001) presents an 
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approach in this direction for iterative auction design. By dynamically solving simpler problems 
he shows that optimal one shot solutions (in our case the optimal incentive compatible 
contract) can be approached. 
 
Conditions for implementation 
Introducing a research facilities based incentive system in a university hospital requires the 
combined and committed efforts from managers, medical specialists, trustees, and 
implementation- and design professionals. As a result, introducing such a system implies costs, 
requires time, and may introduce tensions. It is therefore only worthwhile if sufficient impact 
on hospital performance can be achieved. In any case, sufficient support should exist for 
research facilities based incentives. We have given empirical indications that sufficient support 
exists in typical non-profit university hospitals. The inquiry we held at the Erasmus Medical 
Center in the Netherlands revealed that over 80 percent of the physicians in that hospital 
would prefer to do more research, and over 95 percent of the physicians indicated they derive 
more work stimulus from research possibilities or scientific status than from wage. Erasmus 
Medical Center is a large non-profit university hospital. This is a representative setting for 
many university hospitals, both national and foreign. Hence, we expect that our findings are 
applicable to many university hospitals. The potential impact on hospital performance and the 
potential efficiency improvements necessary to offset the various costs seem present in the 
Erasmus Medical Center. More in-depth analysis of the desired research facilities and the 
underlying support is however recommended. As is a case by case analysis for other hospitals. 
 
 
 
 
8.3 Worked examples 
 
As a final step we present a practical illustration of the effects of the incentive contracts 
through three worked examples.  
 
Suppose the performance and valuation functions are given by: 
 
               √    
 
                  √          
 
            √      √   
 
outside utility is given by: 
 
 ̅                         
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and the hospital has specified a weight       for care performance, and a weight       for 
research performance. 
 
 
Example 1: different abilities  
Suppose the information on ideal working time distribution derived in the inquiry presented in 
chapter 3 (figure 3.4) can be interpreted as an indication for physician ability. (It is natural for 
physicians to want to spend more time on the area they are best at.) Next, neglecting education 
scores, we can identify two relatively common, but yet distinct, physician types: physicians with 
an ideal research percentage around three times as large as their ideal care percentage, and 
physicians with an ideal research percentage around three times as small as their ideal care 
percentage. This leads us to formulate a physician type 1 and 2 with ability scores as given in 
table 8.2 below (with arbitrary values for the valuation parameter and wage): 
 
 
               
Physician 1: 0.75 0.25 0.5 1 
Physician 2: 0.25 0.75 0.5 1 
Table 8.2: Physician characteristics in example 1 
 
 
The optimal levels of effort, research facilities, utility, and performance described by the 
complete contract are given in table 8.3. Also included (bracketed) are the optimal levels in the 
‘current’ situation as formulated in chapter 6. 
 
 
               
Physician 1: 1.27 (0) 0.09 (0.5) 0.42 (0.09) 1.25 (1.25) 
Physician 2: 0.23 (0) 1.44 (2.14) 0.59 (0.91) 1.25 (1.25) 
 
   care research  
Hospital: 1.07 (0.68) 0.58 (0) 0.49 (0.68)  
Table 8.3: Optimal levels of effort, research facilities, utility and performance in example 1  
(bracketed values denote levels in the ‘current’ situation) 
 
 
Compared to the current situation, there is an increase in hospital performance  
  of  57 percent. Care performance is higher, and research performance is slightly lower. Also, 
research facilities are more equally distributed. Physician utility levels are the same in both 
situations, and hence Physicians are equally well off in the optimum as in the current situation. 
 
The hospital optimally offers the physicians the following contracts: 
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The optimal base allocation is negative. Because a negative amount of research facilities cannot 
be allocated, the contracts are transformed to: 
 
   {
                                                                                  
                                                                            
 
 
   {
                                                                                  
                                                                            
 
 
The second physician has a higher powered incentive scheme than the first physician. This is due to 
research incentives and the base allocation; incentives for care are the same for both physicians (which is 
coincidence). 
 
 
Example 2: extension with different preferences 
Consider the same physicians as in example 1, but now with a different valuation parameter. 
These parameters can for example be obtained from the impact characteristics of work 
stimulation factors, as we have presented in chapter 3. For contrast, we take parameters of 0.25 
and 0.75 (which implies a valuation for research facilities that is respectively 1.25 and 3.75 
times as high as wage valuation). The physician characteristics are then given by table 8.4: 
 
 
               
Physician 1: 0.75 0.25 0.25 1 
Physician 2: 0.25 0.75 0.75 1 
Table 8.4: Physician characteristics in example 2 
 
 
The optimal levels of effort, research facilities, utility, and performance described by the 
complete contract are given in table 8.5. 
 
 
               
Physician 1: 0.37 (0) 0.02 (0.09) 0.27 (0.07) 1.25 (1.25) 
Physician 2: 0.37 (0) 2.59 (3.36) 0.73 (0.93) 1.25 (1.25) 
 
   care research  
Hospital: 1.02 (0.79) 0.37 (0) 0.65 (0.79)  
Table 8.5: Optimal levels of effort, research facilities, utility and performance in example 2  
(bracketed values denote levels in the ‘current’ situation) 
 
Because physician 1 is now willing to work less hard to obtain research facilities than physician 
2, he is contracted to deliver less effort and obtains less research facilities than before. The 
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difference in hospital performance compared to the current situation has decreased somewhat, 
but is still 29 percent. The utility of both physicians is unaffected. 
 
The optimal contracts are as follows: 
 
   {
                                                                                  
                                                                            
 
 
   {
                                                                                  
                                                                            
 
 
Physician 1 (who has a lower valuation) has a lower powered incentive scheme than before, whereas 
physician 2 has a higher powdered incentive scheme than before. For both physicians care incentives are 
lower than before. 
 
 
Example 3: extension with an increase in wage 
Consider again the same physicians, but now the wage of physician 1 is increased by 25 
percent. The physician characteristics are given by table 8.6: 
 
 
               
Physician 1: 0.75 0.25 0.25 1.25 
Physician 2: 0.25 0.75 0.75 1 
Table 8.6: Physician characteristics in example 3 
 
 
The optimal levels of effort, research facilities, utility, and performance described by the 
complete contract are given in table 8.7. 
 
 
               
Physician 1: 0.44 (0) 0.03 (0.14) 0.23 (0.05) 1.25 (1.25) 
Physician 2: 0.38 (0) 2.66 (3.41) 0.77 (0.95) 1.25 (1.25) 
 
   care research  
Hospital: 1.06 (0.81) 0.39 (0) 0.67 (0.81)  
Table 8.7: Optimal levels of effort, research facilities, utility and performance in example 3  
(bracketed values denote levels in the ‘current’ situation) 
 
 
Due to the wage increase, physician 1 is now contracted to do deliver more effort but receives 
less research facilities than before. These research facilities are allocated to physician 2 who is 
also contracted to deliver more effort. Again, utility of physicians is unaffected. The difference 
in hospital performance compared to the current situation is 31 percent. 
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The optimal contracts are: 
 
   {
                                                                                  
                                                                            
 
 
   {
                                                                                  
                                                                            
 
 
The increase in wage has only a small effect on incentives (research incentives have increased somewhat). 
The true effect is seen in the base allocation, which has been lowered for both physicians. 
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Chapter 9 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Concluding remarks 
 
In this work, we have studied the possibility of introducing incentives in university hospitals 
through the allocation of research facilities. Our aim was to construct an allocation mechanism 
for research facilities that would maximize hospital performance. We have presented a 
mathematical approach for constructing such an allocation mechanism. 
 
Through an inquiry held at a large regional university hospital we have obtained empirical 
evidence that physicians in university hospitals are more interested in, and susceptible to, 
research facilities based incentives than financial incentives. This is promising as extensive 
financial incentives in typical non-profit university hospitals are hard to justify socially in the 
current political and economical climate. 
 
However, basing an incentive system on research facilities introduces complications. 
Availability of research facilities is often limited. It is simply not possible to allow all physicians 
to do more research as this compromises time spend on care. Also, operating room time is 
limited, and so is time for clinical trials. As we are considering the semi-public sector it is even 
common practice to have an annually fixed research budget. Therefore, the main tradeoff in 
using research facilities within an incentive system is between efficient resource utilization and 
inducement effects.   
 
We have developed a principal-multi-agent model to study the influence of research facilities 
based incentives on hospital performance. The physicians in the model engage in both care 
and research. The model allows for heterogeneity in physician abilities and physician valuation 
for research facilities. Moreover, physicians can receive different wages and hold private 
information.  
 
We have succeeded in constructing an optimal allocation mechanism for research facilities 
within the context of our model. We have shown that university hospitals can increase their 
performance by offering physicians incentive contracts for research facilities consisting of a 
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base allocation and relative or individual incentives. That is, provided that the hospital can 
obtain truthful information on the physicians valuation for research facilities. We have derived 
optimality conditions for an incentive compatible contract in case truthful information on 
physician valuation cannot be directly derived. Although we have assumed the total of available 
research facilities is predetermined, we have given optimality conditions for when the hospital 
wants to set this total optimally and for when there are costs associated to the provision of 
research facilities. 
 
Compared to the current situation, our contracts lead to a slight decrease in research 
performance, but increase overall hospital performance. As care efforts are improved, patients 
will be better off. Optimally, the hospital takes heterogeneity of physicians in account. Ignoring 
heterogeneity may lead to problems with the retention of physicians with high abilities and of 
physicians willing to work hardest. An important consideration in our analysis is to keep the 
current wage system intact. This allows for short term practical extensions of our results. 
 
The optimal incentive compatible contracts are complicated. We have argued that a practical 
alternative may be found in a contract with linear individual incentives. Physicians then 
periodically reveal their valuation through negotiation or evaluation interviews. They are 
offered incentives corresponding to their revealed valuations. If, however, their performance 
levels deviate too much from the optimal performance levels computed with their revealed 
valuation, their incentive contract is adjusted accordingly. 
 
Our findings are applicable to university hospital where sufficient support for research facilities 
incentives exist. Considering the representative setting of the university hospital in which we 
obtained empirical evidence for such support, we expect our results can impact many 
university hospitals, both national and foreign. 
 
 
 
 
9.3 Future work 
 
We have deliberately kept our model as simple as possible whilst incorporating the most 
practically relevant – and previously uninvestigated – aspects. Issues we have not dealt with in 
our model are uncertainty, altruism and coordination. Interesting next steps would be to 
integrate existing results on these areas into our findings. Expanding our work to include the 
concept of time – for example as an additional cost, and limitation, for delivering care and 
research – would be another interesting option. Additional interdependencies between care 
performance and research performance may also be considered. For example, internalizing the 
effects of research status on the treatments the hospital can do. Situations where only team 
output can be contracted also form a point of interest. In practice, it often occurs that multiple 
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physicians are involved with the treatment of a patient or the research of a medicine. The 
outcomes then depend on the combined efforts of the physicians. 
 
On a practical note, there are direct research interests with regard to the precise determination 
of desired research facilities, as well as the estimation of valuation and performance functions. 
Setting up a larger, more in-depth, inquiry, possibly over multiple cross-national university 
hospitals, would be a useful venture in this direction. Further, the selection of the right 
performance criteria that are in line with hospital goals should be another focal point. 
Important considerations in selecting performance criteria are availability of data, measurement 
accuracy, externalities, and in particular the effects of self-induced demand. We imagine a field 
experiment being set up to investigate the working of research facilities based incentives in 
practice.  
 
Lastly, the generality of our model allows the results to be extended beyond the health care 
sector. For instance, budget allocation in the governmental and semi-public sector, or 
organizations in general, when budget allocation has inducement effects on business units. We 
view our work as the first step towards even more nuanced and varied models balancing 
resource utilization versus inducement effects. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1 [Complete contract with homogeneous physicians]   
 
Consider the equivalent problem: 
 
     ∑  
 
   ∑        
 
   ∑           
 
 (A1) 
 
subject to  
 
 ̅                           (A2) 
 
∑  
 
      (A3) 
 
For                and         ,      . 
 
This problem is convex and therefore the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality. 
 
The Lagrange function is given by: 
 
    (∑  
 
   ∑        
 
   ∑           
 
)  ∑  ( ̅       )
 
 
   (∑  
 
  )  ∑                                              
 
 
(A4) 
 
where    denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the  -th constraint. 
 
The KKT first order conditions are given by       
 
  
    
                                (A2) 
 
  
    
                                    (A3) 
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                                                     (A4) 
 
  
   
                              (A5) 
 
and the conditions on the individual rationality constraints given by (A2):  
 
   ( ̅                  )          (A6) 
 
plus the condition on the research facilities constraint (A3): 
 
   (∑  
 
  )     (A7) 
 
and lastly: 
 
                                  
 
                        
      (A8) 
 
Any point   with              and     
    ̅       for all   is a Slater point   we put 
      Consider the case that all         for        : all basic constraints on the 
individual variables are satisfied. From (A8) and         (as we have assumed) it follows that 
     for         the individual rationality constraints (5.2) bind for all physicians. 
Eliminating    for       in (A5), (A6) and (A8) the first part of Proposition 5.1 follows. 
 
From      for       and         it follows that      and hence the research facility 
constraint (5.3) binds. Eliminating    in (A7) and using (A5), (A6), and (A8) it follows that 
      and subsequently that all    are equal for       which gives the second part of 
Proposition 5.1. 
 
The third part follows from      for      , which makes the individual rationality 
constraints (5.2) binding. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.2 [Complete contract with equal types and predetermined 
wage] 
 
Determination of the sufficiency of the KKT conditions for global optimality is analogous to 
the proof of Proposition 5.1. 
 
The Lagrange function is now given by: 
 
    (∑  
 
   ∑        
 
   ∑           
 
)  ∑  ( ̅       )
 
 
   (∑  
 
  )  ∑                                      
 
 
(B1) 
 
The KKT first order conditions correspond to (A5), (A6), and (A7), the   conditions on the 
individual rationality constraints (A9), and the condition on the research facilities constraint 
(A10), plus the   conditions on the individual variables (A11). 
 
Again, because a Slater point exists (we assumed the feasible space is not empty), we put 
      We also put         for         as we may. From (A6) and           we obtain 
that      for         the individual rationality constraints (5.2) bind for all physicians. After 
eliminating    for       the first part of Proposition 5.2 follows from (A5) and (A6). 
 
The second part follows from      for      , (A7) and observing that        , which 
gives      and hence both the research facilities constraint (5.3) and the individual rationality 
constraints (5.2) bind. 
 
The third part is directly derived from (A5) and (A7) after the elimination of    for        . 
 
     
 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.3 [Complete contract with equal types and predetermined 
wage] 
 
Take the parameterized functions given in chapter 4 and proceed according to the proof of 
Proposition 5.2. Proposition 5.3 follows. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 6.1 [Best response function for homogeneous physicians and 
predetermined wage]   
 
Consider the equivalent problem: 
 
                           (C1) 
 
subject to 
    
         (C2) 
 
For            and         . 
 
Since         is concave it is a convex problem and the KKT conditions are sufficient for 
optimality. 
 
The Lagrange function is given by: 
 
    (                )    (    
      )                            
(C3) 
 
where    denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the  -th constraint. 
 
The KKT first order conditions are       
 
  
    
          
                            (C4) 
 
  
    
          
                               (C5) 
 
  
   
                        
                                 (C6) 
 
 
and the condition on the allocation constraint (C2): 
 
  (    
      )    (C7) 
 
and: 
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We put      and               as we may. Eliminating    and rearranging terms the 
condition follows from combining (C4), (C5) and (C6). If         is concave, the point 
             satisfying these conditions is the global optimum. 
     
 
 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.1 [Incomplete contract with homogeneous physicians and 
predetermined wage]   
 
From Proposition 5.2 we have that  
 
                         (D1) 
 
for physician  , and  
 
      (   )               (D2) 
 
for physician  . Combining with condition (5.4) this leads to three independent conditions. 
Given that the efforts of physician   are optimal and satisfy (D2), for physician  ’s efforts to be 
optimal as well, it should hold that: 
 
                                   
      (      )    (     )        (   ) 
(D3) 
 
and 
 
                                   
      (      )    (     )              
(D4) 
 
 
 
The physician’s choice of effort is determined by first-order conditions (6.3). Comparing with 
(D3) and (D4), solving for     
       and     
       and rewriting, the results follow. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.1 [Optimal contract under private information]   
 
We solve the problem using the calculus of variations. Let the vector functions         
  
      for         denote Lagrange multipliers (as the two multipliers for the individual 
rationality constraints will be set to 0 (as we may), we omit them for ease of exposition), and let 
                  denote an arbitrary vector function. The first order conditions are given by 
 
∬ (     (   (     )    )   (     )        (     ))         (  )      
 
 
   (E1) 
       
      
      
    
 
 
 
∬ (     (   (     )              )   (     )        (     ))         (  )      
 
 
   
(E2) 
       
      
      
    
 
 
∬ (     (   (     )              )   (     )              (     )     
   (     )
   
 
 
  (     )          (     )        (     )      (     ))       
  (  )         
(E3) 
       
      
      
    
 
After an integration by parts, and by observing that             , this system reduces to: 
 
∬ (     (   (     )    )        
           
   
)   (     )   (  )      
 
 
   (E4) 
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∬ (     (   (     )              )        
           
   
)   (     )   (  )      
 
 
=0 (E5) 
       
      
      
    
 
 
∬ (     (   (     )              )              (     (     )   )  
   (     )
   
 
 
       
         (     )    
   
          )   (     )   (  )      
   
(E6) 
       
      
      
    
 
 
Now, applying the main theorem of the calculus of variations, it follows that for the above 
integrals to be zero, it must hold that: 
 
(     (   (     )    )        
           
   
)   (  )    (E7) 
       
      
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
(     (   (     )              )        
           
   
)   (  )    (E8) 
       
      
    
 
 
(     (   (     )              )              (     (     )   )  
   (     )
   
      
 
         (     )    
   
          )   (  )    
(E9) 
       
      
    
 
 
Integrating and solving the differential equations (E7) and (E8) for    leads to the first part of 
Proposition 7.1 (after elimination of    . The second part holds because the Lagrange 
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multipliers for the individual rationality constraint are zero. The third part follows from 
substituting    in (E9) and eliminating     
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